Jon Cops Out
Kant’s argument for Time as a product of a priori intuition eviscerates itself on the first sentence. Kant is entirely convinced that time is not the product of empirical experience (Kant, 1781, pg 32). This, however, goes contrary to human concepts of time. The passage of time, as it refers to clocks, calendars, and the like, is very much an empirical product. The notion of time was first derived from repetition in nature. Man’s knowledge of time wasn’t intuited. It was calculated using mathematical means. Ancient man looked at the sky and noticed that certain star formations appeared in the sky at certain places at certain points in continuity. By tracking these star formations, ancient man was able to create a relatively accurate calendar that was able to predict seasonal changes and the timing of religious holidays. This notion of change was not a priori. It was noticed, and meticulously recorded for future observation. This recognition of time through empirical notation shatters Kant’s assertion that time is completely a priori. The acknowledgement that time is a completely subjective object of human experience does not make Kant’s argument consistent. Although he seems to recover when he notes that there is only one time, and all other times are derivative of this one time (given the possibility of a consistent time mark in the universe), his other comments regarding the consistency of time with relation to human perception deny Kant this saving grace (Kant, 1781, pg 32) (Kant, 1781, pg 34).
The concepts behind Kant’s arguments cannot be completely denied. Time does exist. To say otherwise would be to take a Parminedean stance and reject completely the notion of time. To do so would be to ignore the lack of complete object permanence. Lack of complete object permanence, or change through continuity, is proof that there is concepts of time and that it is not an artificial fabrication. In order to give Kant’s philosophy more accreditation, I believe small word change is in order. I do not think Kant meant Time, when he was talking about changes in continuity. It is possible that he did not know the proper word for the concepts of which he discussed, or that the German word did not translate well in to English. I am wholly convinced, though, that Kant did not mean Time, but Continuity. Time is an artificial concept. Continuity is not. Change in Continuity is the means by which we conceive notions of time. Thus, Time is a posteriori, whereas Continuity is possibly a priori.
Having fixed this small semantics error, we can now re-approach Kant’s premises on Time. Continuity is not derived from empirical experience. How can this be so, if all information gleaned is processed through sensory means? Our awareness of continuity comes from seeing things change. An object’s position in one point of continuity is not the same as its position in the next point of continuity. Our senses process this and the mind comes to the conclusion that the object has moved. The moving is quite empirical, however, the space in continuity is not even recognized. Certainly something has transpired, as the object cannot possess simultaneous positions in all points of continuity, at least according to our awareness. Kant would argue that the recognition of differentiation in points of continuity is based on pure intuition. We intuit that there have been changes in continuity, leading to motion and concepts of time. Kant calls this intuit sequential intuition (P -> Q), and uses it to confer actuality on motion as well as time frame changes.
But, if changes in points of continuity were a priori, then every human would have the exact same notions of continuity. This does not explain differences in concepts of continuity, especially among the sensory deprived or the brain damaged. Let us suppose a newly born human is placed in a sensory deprivation chamber. All repetition that would give it a sense of time is denied. The five senses of the child have been rendered void, and nothing in the sensory chamber ever changes. The child does not have a sense of time, as time is based on observed change, but does it have a sense of continuity? Kant would argue that the child would have a sense of continuity, because the mind would be able to intuit changes between point A of continuity and point B of continuity. His proof for this is quite sketchy. It is enough for him that continuity is an inner sense. But, his descriptions of how this inner sense came about rely extensively on changes in points of continuity, which are excessively dependant on observations. The deprived child has nothing. Therefore, I cannot be entirely convinced that the deprived child has any notion of continuity.
Some might argue that the deprived child would some how be able to intuit change through changes in his body. The body grows. There has been some change along lines of continuity. This argument may have merit, but loses it if the child cannot feel. Perhaps a more likely scenario is in order, because it is not common for children to be placed in sensory deprivation chambers. It is more common for people to accidentally damage their hypothalamus and lose the ability to create new memories. Memory is the medium by which the mind notes changes in continuity. We remember a frame of time and are able to compare it to the next frame of time in order to determine change. If a person damages their hypothalamus, s/he loses the ability to create new memories. Certainly, the memories of the past have given the person the knowledge of time, but since they cannot formulate new memories, they have no basis of time change. For them, time dies when their hypothalamus perishes. The damaged have no way of discerning new time, but can they note continuity? Kant would still insist that the damaged can intuit continuity, even without the ability to note time. Continuity is the absolute, and the mind, even damaged, can reason through the absolute. Having read Oliver Sack’s theories on the lack of memory cogitation, I remain eminently unconvinced that continuity is completely a priori, but an unable to explain why.
To this, Kant would reply that my inability to explain the properties of continuity is proof that I merely intuit it, and lack the adequate cognition to prove otherwise. The idea of continuity is simply something that the mind processes completely without experience, much like my sexuality. I cannot completely explain why I prefer redheads with round derrieres, but I do because something in my body compels me to appreciate them. It has come that I must grudgingly accept some of Kant’s arguments for the intuition of continuity because I have no other argument to explain the complete awareness of transition between points on scale. Things are certainly sequential.
Sources Cited
Kant, I. (1787). Critique of pure reason (Abridged). Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company.
Sacks, O (1998). The man who mistook his wife for a hat: And other clinical tales. New
York: Touchstone.
The concepts behind Kant’s arguments cannot be completely denied. Time does exist. To say otherwise would be to take a Parminedean stance and reject completely the notion of time. To do so would be to ignore the lack of complete object permanence. Lack of complete object permanence, or change through continuity, is proof that there is concepts of time and that it is not an artificial fabrication. In order to give Kant’s philosophy more accreditation, I believe small word change is in order. I do not think Kant meant Time, when he was talking about changes in continuity. It is possible that he did not know the proper word for the concepts of which he discussed, or that the German word did not translate well in to English. I am wholly convinced, though, that Kant did not mean Time, but Continuity. Time is an artificial concept. Continuity is not. Change in Continuity is the means by which we conceive notions of time. Thus, Time is a posteriori, whereas Continuity is possibly a priori.
Having fixed this small semantics error, we can now re-approach Kant’s premises on Time. Continuity is not derived from empirical experience. How can this be so, if all information gleaned is processed through sensory means? Our awareness of continuity comes from seeing things change. An object’s position in one point of continuity is not the same as its position in the next point of continuity. Our senses process this and the mind comes to the conclusion that the object has moved. The moving is quite empirical, however, the space in continuity is not even recognized. Certainly something has transpired, as the object cannot possess simultaneous positions in all points of continuity, at least according to our awareness. Kant would argue that the recognition of differentiation in points of continuity is based on pure intuition. We intuit that there have been changes in continuity, leading to motion and concepts of time. Kant calls this intuit sequential intuition (P -> Q), and uses it to confer actuality on motion as well as time frame changes.
But, if changes in points of continuity were a priori, then every human would have the exact same notions of continuity. This does not explain differences in concepts of continuity, especially among the sensory deprived or the brain damaged. Let us suppose a newly born human is placed in a sensory deprivation chamber. All repetition that would give it a sense of time is denied. The five senses of the child have been rendered void, and nothing in the sensory chamber ever changes. The child does not have a sense of time, as time is based on observed change, but does it have a sense of continuity? Kant would argue that the child would have a sense of continuity, because the mind would be able to intuit changes between point A of continuity and point B of continuity. His proof for this is quite sketchy. It is enough for him that continuity is an inner sense. But, his descriptions of how this inner sense came about rely extensively on changes in points of continuity, which are excessively dependant on observations. The deprived child has nothing. Therefore, I cannot be entirely convinced that the deprived child has any notion of continuity.
Some might argue that the deprived child would some how be able to intuit change through changes in his body. The body grows. There has been some change along lines of continuity. This argument may have merit, but loses it if the child cannot feel. Perhaps a more likely scenario is in order, because it is not common for children to be placed in sensory deprivation chambers. It is more common for people to accidentally damage their hypothalamus and lose the ability to create new memories. Memory is the medium by which the mind notes changes in continuity. We remember a frame of time and are able to compare it to the next frame of time in order to determine change. If a person damages their hypothalamus, s/he loses the ability to create new memories. Certainly, the memories of the past have given the person the knowledge of time, but since they cannot formulate new memories, they have no basis of time change. For them, time dies when their hypothalamus perishes. The damaged have no way of discerning new time, but can they note continuity? Kant would still insist that the damaged can intuit continuity, even without the ability to note time. Continuity is the absolute, and the mind, even damaged, can reason through the absolute. Having read Oliver Sack’s theories on the lack of memory cogitation, I remain eminently unconvinced that continuity is completely a priori, but an unable to explain why.
To this, Kant would reply that my inability to explain the properties of continuity is proof that I merely intuit it, and lack the adequate cognition to prove otherwise. The idea of continuity is simply something that the mind processes completely without experience, much like my sexuality. I cannot completely explain why I prefer redheads with round derrieres, but I do because something in my body compels me to appreciate them. It has come that I must grudgingly accept some of Kant’s arguments for the intuition of continuity because I have no other argument to explain the complete awareness of transition between points on scale. Things are certainly sequential.
Sources Cited
Kant, I. (1787). Critique of pure reason (Abridged). Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Company.
Sacks, O (1998). The man who mistook his wife for a hat: And other clinical tales. New
York: Touchstone.
posted by Jon at 6:10 PM
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